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THE HAZARDS OF OUR
HAZARDOUS WASTE POLICY
WILLIAM GOLDFARB*
INTRODUCTION
Solid waste regulation has traditionally been the stepchild of fed-
eral pollution control law. In the areas of air and water pollution
control a mature federal presence has culminated in comprehensive
regulatory statutes of general applicability,1 whereas the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act of 19762 (RCRA) represents but a
tentative second step in a comparatively recent federal effort.3 The
eclipse of federal solid waste law by other pollution media has to a
great extent been the result of four historic assumptions about solid
waste: 1) solid waste is relatively innocuous; 2) solid waste manage-
ment is aft inherently local and state problem; 3) solid waste prob-
lems are susceptible to technological solutions; and 4) remedial tech-
nology can and should be developed and applied primarily by the
private sector. It is the purpose of this article to show that even
though these assumptions may once have been correct, their persis-
tence despite a changing definition of solid waste has handicapped
American hazardous waste policy.
*Associate Professor of Environmental Law, Cook College, Rutgers University, New
Brunswick, New Jersey.
1. The first Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted in 1948 (Pub. L. No.
80-845). The Act was significantly amended in 1956 (Pub. L. No. 84-660), 1965 (Pub. L.
No. 89-234), 1966 (Pub. L. No. 89-753), 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-224), 1972 (Pub. L. No.
92-500), and 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-217). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (com-
monly referred to as the Clean Water Act) has been codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq
(1976).
Federal air pollution control legislation originated with the Air Pollution Act of 1955
(Pub. L. No. 84-159). It was substantially modified by the Clean Air Act of 1963 (Pub. L.
No. 88-206) and amendments in 1965 (Pub. L. No. 89-272), 1967 (Pub. L. No. 90-148),
1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-604), and 1977 (Pub. L. No. 95-95). The Clean Air Act has been
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 42 U.S.C. §6901 etseq (1976).
3. The Solid Waste Disposal Act, as amended (Title II of Pub. L. No. 89-272 (1965), and
Pub. L. No. 91-512 (1970)) authorized funding for research and planning. Regulation of
solid waste facilities was limited to mandatory guidelines for federal installations. RCRA
completely replaced the previous language of the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
For the conceptual differences between the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act on the
one hand and RCRA on the other, see text material at footnotes 26-30. In general, the Clean
Air Act and Clean Water Act attempt to regulate all dischargers to air and water, whereas
RCRA seeks only to regulate certain aspects of the solid waste process-hazardous waste
disposal and open dumps.
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Solid waste regulation has also been subordinated to other en-
vironmental concerns because it is subversive in ways which deprive
it of a broad constituency. First, the solid waste problem is subver-
sive of America's production ethic to a greater degree than either air
or water pollution:
Unlike air or water pollution, pollution of the land by discarded
materials is not exclusively caused by the by-products of the produc-
tive process. A large volume of our waste represents the actual
product of our industrial and manufacturing processes. These wastes
are the direct result of the demand for products and a need to
dispose of them once they have served their purpose. These wastes
are the result of the American lifestyle which includes an often
wasteful emphasis on convenience or advertising.4
With regard to solid waste, the product itself is often the externality.
Thus, solid waste pollution compels society to confront basic ques-
tions of economics and ideology to an extent that air and water
pollution do not.
Second, the solid waste problem contains an implicit indictment
of American environmentalism. At least temporarily, air and water
pollution control have merely caused the changing of the situs of
pollution rather than diminishing the absolute amount of residuals.'
Sludges from air and water pollution control processes have been
classified as solid waste, a term which has become the catchall of
American pollution control. RCRA's definition of "solid waste"
illustrates this trend:
The term 'solid waste' means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a
waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid,
semisolid, or contained material resulting from industrial, commer-
cial, mining, and agricultural operations and community activi-
ties .... 6
The elements of "solid waste" (the term itself is a misnomer 7 ) are
4. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REPORT ON
H.R. 14496, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976) (hereinafter "leg. hist.").
5. For example, the application of Phase I ("BPT") effluent limitations under the Clean
Water Act has definitely resulted in more sludge from municipal and industrial treatment
processes. However, the increased stringency of effluent limitations during Phase II, the
enforcement of industrial pretreatment requirements, and new source performance stan-
dards may well reduce the overall amount of generated residuals by encouraging process
changes and recycling.
6. RCRA §1004 (27), 42 U.S.C. §6903 (27) (1976).
7. The House Committee On Interstate And Foreign Commerce recognized the inappro-
priateness of the term, and recommended substitution of "discarded materials." The Com-
mittee would also have excluded agricultural and mine wastes from RCRA's ambit (leg. hist.
2, 3). It is not clear from the legislative history why these recommendations were not
followed.
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heterogeneous physically and conceptually. This "muck stops here"
waste category includes materials which are readily disposable (or-
ganic household garbage) and other materials which society either
does not desire to or know how to dispose of completely (e.g.,
mining wastes, automobile tires, and persistent chemical wastes). It is
convenient for environmentalists and industrialists alike to identify a
category in which superannuated refrigerators and contaminated
sludge from municipal treatment plans are considered as if they were
remnants of a family picnic in Peoria. The engrafting of a class of
intractable pollutants upon a class of innocuous but prolific pollu-
tants to form a composite solid waste category has distorted the
original definition of solid waste and distracted us from our most
compelling pollution problem-dealing with the hazardous residues
of production and pollution control processes.
According to United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) estimates, ten to twenty percent of all industrial wastes, ex-
cluding mining and agricultural wastes, will be listed as hazardous.8
Thus, of the approximately 345 million tons of industrial wastes
generated annually, some 46 million tons are hazardous. Perhaps 90
percent of these hazardous wastes, or 41 million tons, is being clis-
posed of improperly. Approximately 80 percent of the hazardous
wastes annually generated by American industry are disposed of on
the generator's site in pits, ponds, lagoons, or industrial landfills.
EPA studied 50 on-site disposal areas, and found that in 43 cases
toxic chemicals were leaching into groundwater in unacceptable con-
centrations. The remaining 20 percent of hazardous industrial wastes
is transported to off-site disposal areas such as municipal landfills,
ocean dumping sites, and hazardous waste treatment and disposal
facilities.
New Jersey generates more hazardous industrial waste than any
other state: approximately 350,000 tons per year. Much of New
Jersey's hazardous waste is discharged into publicly owned sewage
treatment works, which presently dump their sludge into the Atlan-
tic Ocean. But New Jersey industries will soon be required to adopt
land-related disposal methods for these wastes because of the 1981
Congressional deadline for curtailing ocean dumping of sewage
sludge, 9 and also because of strengthened EPA pretreatment regula-
tions. 1 0
8. The statistics in this paragraph are derived from statements by EPA officials sum-
marized in 9 BNA ENV. REPTR. CURR. DEV. 1301 (November 17, 1978). See also
COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, HOW TO DISPOSE OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE-A SERIOUS QUESTION THAT NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED
(December 19, 1978).
9. Section 4 of Pub. L. No. 95-153, amending Pub. L. No. 92-532, 33 U.S.C. § 1420.
10. 40 C.F.R. Pt. 403, 43 Fed. Reg. 27746 (June 26, 1978).
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The tragedy at Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, is only one
of an unremitting series of hazardous waste horror stories,'' perhaps
the most hideous of which is the incalculable damage to public
health and the environment caused by Kepone disposal in Hopewell,
Virginia.' 2 The most frequent result of inadequate hazardous waste
disposal is the pollution of increasingly critical groundwater sup-
plies.1 3 State hazardous waste programs range from comprehensive
to nonexistent.' 4
Congress' "overriding concern" in enacting RCRA was "the effect
on the population and the environment of the disposal of discarded
hazardous wastes-those which by virtue of their composition or
longevity are harmful, toxic, or lethal."' I A federal regulatory ap-
proach was thought to be necessary for the management of hazard-
ous wastes because:
[h] azardous wastes typically have little, if any, economic value; are
often not susceptible to neutralization; present serious danger to
human life and the environment; and can only be safely stored,
treated or disposed of at considerable cost to the generator. Without
a regulatory framework, such hazardous waste will continue to be
disposed of in ponds or lagoons or on the ground.in a manner which
results in substantial and sometimes irreversible pollution of the
environment.16
One of the Congressional Committees which drafted RCRA declared
that "the approach taken by this legislation eliminates the last re-
maining loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land
disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes .... ,,' I
11. For details of the Love Canal incident, see 9 BNA ENV. REPTR. CURR. DEV. 581
(August 11, 1978); see also Emptied Niagara Neighborhood Now Looks Like A Disaster
Area, N.Y. TIMES, November 22, 1978, at B4. Previous incidents are described in leg. hist.,
17-22 and COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT,
47 (1977). The pollution at Love Canal was caused by an abandoned hazardous waste
disposal site. This article does not deal with the problem of financial responsibility for
damage caused by active, inactive, and abandoned sites. For a discussion of the abandoned
site issue see GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 23-27.
12. See Goldfarb, Kepone: A Case Study, 8 ENV. L. 645 (1978).
13. See CEQ REPORT, supra note 11, at 46; see also COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES, WASTE DISPOSAL PRACTICES-A THREAT TO HEALTH AND
THE NATION'S WATER SUPPLY (June 16, 1978).
14. Leg. hist., 23-24.
15. Leg. hist., 3. RCRA defines "hazardous waste" as "a solid waste or combination of
solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or in-
fectious characteristics may-
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase
in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of
or otherwise managed. (RCRA, § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. §6903(5) (1976).
16. Leg. hist., 4.
17. Id.
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ANALYSIS OF RCRA
RCRA's approach to hazardous waste management' 8 consists of
four major elements: 1) federal identification of hazardous wastes; 2)
a manifest system for tracing hazardous wastes from generator, to
transporter, to disposal facility; 3) federal minimum standards for
hazardous waste disposal, enforced through permits for disposal facil-
ities; and 4) state implementation of hazardous waste management
programs at least equivalent to the federal program.
EPA is responsible for issuing regulations containing criteria for
identifying hazardous wastes and listing particular hazardous
wastes." 9 The initial hazardous waste list may be revised by EPA
whenever appropriate. State governors may petition EPA to identify
or list a material as a hazardous waste, and EPA must either grant or
deny the petition within 90 days. Moreover, any person may petition
EPA "for the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any regula-
tion" under RCRA.2 I EPA must take action on a citizen petition
"within a reasonable time" and publish in the Federal Register its
reasons for taking such action.
Regulations are also to be promulgated with regard to generators
and transporters of listed hazardous wastes. 2' Generators of hazard-
ous wastes must keep records and report to the federal government,
initiate a manifest system "to assure that all such hazardous waste
generated is designated for treatment, storage or disposal in ... facili-
ties . . . for which a permit has been issued," 2 2 and properly label
and containerize hazardous wastes delivered to transporters and dis-
posal facilities. The duties of a transporter involve recordkeeping and
reporting, accepting only properly labeled and containerized wastes,
complying with the manifest system, and, most important, trans-
18. RCRA, SUBTITLE C, § § 3001-3011,42 U.S.C. § §6921-6931 (1976).
19. RCRA § 3001, 42 U.S.C. § 6921. Most of the SUBTITLE C regulations were required
to be promulgated within 18 months after RCRA's enactment on October 21, 1976. EPA
was unable to meet this April 21, 1978 deadline, and was subsequently sued by number of
environmental groups (GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 3). Proposed regulations including
1) criteria for identifying and listing hazardous wastes, identification methods, and a hazard-
ous waste list; 2) standards applicable to generators of hazardous wastes for recordkeeping,
labeling, containerizing, and using a transport manifest; and 3) performance standards for
hazardous waste treatment and disposal facilities, were issued on December 18, 1978 (43
Fed. Reg. 58946, proposing regulations at 40 CFR Pt. 250). Final regulations are expected
to be promulgated early in 1980, to take effect during mid-1980 (GAO REPORT, supra
note 8, at 3). On January 3, 1979, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia issued a compliance schedule for promulgation of SUBTITLE C regulations. This
court-ordered timetable is substantially the same as EPA's own schedule (9 BNA ENV.
REPTR. CURR. DEV. 1696, January 12, 1979).
20. RCRA § 7004, 42 U.S.C. § 6974 (1976).
21. RCRA § § 3002 and 3003, 42 U.S.C. § §6922 and 6923.
22. RCRA § 3002(5), 42 U.S.C. §6922(5) (1976).
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porting all such hazardous waste only to the permitted disposal facil-
ity which the generator identifies on the manifest.
Permits are not required of generators or transporters of hazardous
wastes but disposal, treatment, or storage of these wastes is pro-
hibited except in accordance with a permit.2 3 In order to obtain and
retain a permit, an owner or operator of a disposal facility (which
includes treatment and storage) must meet EPA performance stan-
dards governing location, design, construction, operation, and main-
tenance of such facilities. The applicable performance standards
become permit conditions, in addition to the recordkeeping and
reporting requirements. The manifest system terminates with the
receipt of the wastes by the owner or operator of the disposal facility
and his notification to the generator.
A state is authorized to administer and enforce a hazardous waste
regulatory program in lieu of the federal program if EPA finds that
the state program is equivalent to the federal program and is consis-
tent with the programs of neighboring states.' 4 No state may impose
less stringent requirements than those included in federal law, but a
state may elect to be more stringent. Twenty-five million dollars per
annum has been authorized for fiscal years 1978 and 1979 to fund
grants to states for the development and implementation of state
hazardous waste programs.
EPA is the primary enforcement authority where a state program
has not been approved. Even subsequent to approval, EPA can en-
force directly against a violator after giving notice to the state. If an
approved program is later determined to be inadequate, EPA may
withdraw program authorization and reinstitute the federal program
in that state.
RCRA provides EPA with a broad range of enforcement mech-
anisms, including compliance orders, civil actions for injunctions,
civil penalties of up to $25,000.00 per day of violation, permit sus-
pension or revocation, and criminal indictments for knowing trans-
portation to an unpermitted facility, unpermitted disposal, and
making false statements in applications, manifests, labels, and re-
ports. State programs must "provide adequate enforcement of com-
pliance with" RCRA, but state enforcement tools may be less com-
prehensive and incisive than those which RCRA provides EPA.2 s
23. RCRA §3005(a), 42 U.S.C. §6925(a) (1976).
24. RCRA § 3006, 42 U.S.C. §6926 (1976).
25. EPA Proposed Guidelines For State Hazardous Waste Programs, §250.72(a)(3). See
also proposed regulations, supra note 19.
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EVALUATION OF RCRA
In evaluating RCRA's approach to hazardous waste regulation, it is
helpful to compare RCRA to other environmental statutes. Both the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act impose discharge limitations on
producer-dischargers. 2 6 Discharges are illegal if they violate emis-
sions limitations contained in State Implementation Plans (for
sources of air pollution) or effluent limitations included in National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits (for dischargers to
waterways). In contrast, RCRA's focus is on the disposal facility, not
the generator: "Rather than place restrictions on the generation of
hazardous waste, which in many instances would amount to interfer-
ence with the productive process itself, the Committee has limited
the responsibility of the generator for hazardous waste to one of
providing information. '2 7
RCRA's axiom of hazardous waste management-primary regula-
tion of waste disposal rather than generation-perpetuates the anti-
quated "presumption of innocuousness" of solid waste, and compli-
cates the regulatory process by separating generation from disposal.
Although RCRA imposes certain recordkeeping and reporting re-
quirements on generators,2 8 it is doubtful whether understaffed and
underfunded environmental agencies will be able to monitor and
enforce these duties without a permit program or its equivalent.
Moreover, by attempting to control hazardous waste without inhibi-
ting production, Congress has ignored the successful "technology
forcing" approach of the Clean Air Act 2 9 and the "available technol-
ogy" orientation of the Clean Water Act 3 in favor of a system
which appears convoluted and misdirected.
It goes without saying that the ultimate goal of pollution control
is the diminution of residuals by recycling and reuse. In theory,
recycling will render the production process more efficient by re-
ducing raw material and disposal costs. The effluent limitation ap-
proach incorporated in the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act
encourages recycling and reuse by imposing the actual costs of dis-
posal on the producer of goods, thus removing the artificial public
26. Clean Water Act, § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311, Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
27. Leg. hist., 26.
28. See note 19, supra.
29. See La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protection Statutes,
62 IOWA LAW REVIEW 771 (1977); Bonine, The Evolution of "Technology-Forcing" in
the Clean Air Act, BNA ENV. REPTR. MONOGRAPH No. 21 (1975).
30. See Goldfarb, Better Than Best: A Crosscurrent in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 11 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 1 (1976).
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subsidy which pollution in general has traditionally represented. In
sum, both the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act attempt to de-
crease residuals by making actual disposal costs an inescapable res-
ponsibility of producers.
In defiance of this basic tenet of pollution control policy, RCRA
divorces generation from disposal, and adopts an excessively compli-
cated system whereby responsibility is fragmented among generators,
transporters, and disposal facilities. Why should generators not be
legally responsible for their hazardous waste disposal? Under such a
regime, generators could still take advantage of economies of scale by
transporting wastes for off-site treatment even though generators
would remain legally responsible for the wastes until they have been
disposed of in an acceptable manner. This would be preferable to the
present system under RCRA, where the high costs of waste disposal,
the awkwardness of the statutory scheme, and the chronic insuffi-
ciency of resources of state agencies will tempt unscrupulous genera-
tors to circumvent the manifest system and continue to condone the
illicit dumping which constitutes the bane of hazardous waste man-
agement. 3 1 To adopt a metaphor as grisly as a hazardous waste
incident, the "cradle to grave" RCRA management scheme is likely
to result in a higher frequency of "induced abortions."
Undoubtedly, RCRA's implementation will cause a shift from on-
site to off-site storage and disposal.3 2 It may be that placing direct
responsibility on generators will stimulate the law-abiding among
them to acquire transportation and disposal facilities, but anti-
monopoly arguments appear insignificant beside the public health
benefits which would result from such regulation. More likely, a
relative certainty of enforcement will induce generators to find in-
novative means of waste disposal: recycling or parasitic-symbiotic
relationships with other industries. Residuals can never be com-
pletely eliminated, but placing legal responsibility for hazardous
waste disposal on generators will maintain the pressure for recycling
through an administratively feasible system.
As if this fundamental flaw in RCRA were not enough, two other
factors-both arising from specious assumptions about solid waste-
militate against an effective hazardous waste policy. First, there is
the myth of private sector competence to effectuate technological
31. See e.g., Leepson, Midnight Riders, ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION, Vol. 10, No. 11
(October 7, 1978). Generators may also be encouraged to "toll" processes producing
hazardous wastes: Le., spin off these activities to undercapitalized and irresponsible sub-
sidiaries or "friendly companies" (see Goldfarb, supra note 12).
32. See text at note 8, supra.
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solutions to the hazardous waste problem. According to the Council
on Environmental Quality:
[t] he technology for environmentally sound treatment, storage,
and disposal of hazardous waste is generally available. It is far from
fully used because there has been no economic incentive or, until
passage of RCRA, little legal compulsion to do so. Good hazardous
waste management can cost 10 to 40 times as much as unsatisfactory
methods in current use-dumping, ponding, and burial without ade-
quate safeguards. According to a recent study, the hazardous waste
industry was comprised of 95 firms with 110 sites in 1975. Average
utilization of capacity was 53 percent, ranging from 30 to 80 per-
cent, depending on the process and the region of the country. The
study estimated that there was environmentally adequate capacity
for 5.3 million tons of hazardous waste in 1974. This compares with
an estimated 29 million metric tons of hazardous waste generated by
14 important industries in 1974. 33
The author has already questioned the legal compulsion exercisable
under RCRA. It is also questionable whether there is in fact an
economic incentive to use existing treatment capacity and increase
capacity to meet even current industrial needs. This inquiry is critical
because RCRA is predicated on the existence of adequate capacity to
store, treat, and dispose of hazardous wastes.3  If the current serious
shortfall of treatment capacity continues into the future, RCRA will
fail because it is not technology-forcing as to generators.3 5
Because of the significantly greater cost of proper hazardous waste
management, unscrupulous generators will continue to engage in
illegal dumping through ostensibly independent contractors. Honest
generators will seek every possible means of reducing the cost of
waste treatment, from recycling to acquisition of transportation and
disposal facilities, to participation in waste exchanges.3 6 Thus, a
company considering entering the hazardous waste disposal field or
enlarging present capacity will face the unattractive prospect of mas-
sive capital investment, significant legal liability, close government
regulation, unpredictable future regulatory steps, and tenuous
demand. Moreover, RCRA does not authorize low cost loans or tax
incentives for construction of hazardous waste disposal facilities. All
in all, the hazardous waste disposal business seems to be a risky one
at best.
The second myth preventing effective hazardous waste policy is
33. CEQ REPORT, supra note 11, at 46-47.
34. GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
35. See id at 5-10 for a discussion of capacity shortages.
36. But see id at 17-21, which concludes that volume cannot be appreciably reduced.
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that of solid waste as a uniquely local and state problem. One of the
most troublesome dilemmas confronting hazardous waste managers
"is that most people simply do not want a solid waste disposal
project in their neighborhoods, especially for hazardous material."'3 I
The siting issue is so formidable that an EPA official has been quoted
as predicting that RCRA's hazardous waste control program may
"fall flat" because of facility siting problems.' 8 RCRA does not
regulate the siting of facilities, and municipalities regularly reject the
development of such facilities because of public opposition. In fact,
some municipalities have attempted to expel existing facilities on
public nuisance grounds.3 9 No state presently possesses explicit legis-
lative or administrative authority to override local exclusions of
hazardous waste facilities.4 0 For example, the State of Minnesota
was compelled to return unexpended federal funds intended for the
location, design, and construction of a state hazardous waste facility
because public opposition prevented the location of a suitable site.4 1
EPA's reaction to the siting issue has been the assertion that states
should conclusively determine the locations of hazardous waste facil-
ities.4 2 But it is unclear how states will be insulated from the pro-
tests of indignant municipalities. Furthermore, the siting of hazard-
ous waste facilities is a problem transcending state boundaries. It is a
regional concern because the economics of hazardous waste treat-
ment dictate large, guaranteed waste streams.4 ' Rhode Island
Governor J. Joseph Garrahy, head of the hazardous waste advisory
group to the New England Regional Commission, has recently stated:
Both individual states and industries acting alone will find it diffi-
cult to develop the necessary [hazardous waste] facilities. The
volume of wastes generated within individual states, particularly the
less industrial states, seldom justifies the construction of complex
facilities to service each state. The economic infeasibility of privately
developed facilities for each state, combined with regulatory prob-
37. CEQ REPORT, supra note 11, at 49. See also GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 10-17.
38. Gary Dietrich, EPA's Associate Director for Solid Waste, in 9 BNA ENV. REPTR,
CURR. DEV. 1045 (September 29, 1978).
39. See Village of Wilsonville v. Earthline Corporation, 65 Ill. App.3d 392, 282 N.E.2d
689 (1978) where an Illinois court ordered the closure of a major hazardous waste facility as
well as the removal of thousands of barrels of wastes previously buried, despite state permits
and EPA approval of the site. The removal order has been stayed pending appeal.
40. There is case law in a few states declaring state preemption of local zoning decisions
involving sanitary landfills. See Carlson v. City of Worth, 25 Ill. App. 3d 315, 322 N.E.2d
852 (1974); Town of Gloucester v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 390 A.2d
348 (R.I. 1978); Ringlieb v. Township of East Orange, 59 N.J. 348, 283 A.2d 97 (1971).
41. Supra note 38; See also GAO REPORT, supra note 8, at 13.
42. See remarks of Steffen Plehn, EPA Deputy Administrator for Solid Waste, reported
at 9 BNA ENV. REPTR. CURR. DEV. 1178 (October 20, 1978).
43. Id.
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lems and the difficulty of siting such facilities, discourage private
initiatives to develop needed facilities.
4 4
From every perspective, regional hazardous waste management sys-
tems are the most sensible approach.
The siting issue aside, there is a good deal of uncertainty about
RCRA's mode of implementing hazardous waste management pro-
grams, which is to authorize state programs with supportive federal
supervisory and enforcement power. Experience with similar stat-
utory schemes indicates that many states will institute their own
environmental protection programs in areas covered by federal legis-
lation only where there is sufficient inducement to overcome the
natural inclination to save money and "let the Feds take the
heat." 4
One way to disarm state resistance to carrying out a funda-
mentally federal program is to make it financially worthwhile for a
state to do so. Federal program grants can persuade state legislators
and administrators that the program would be less expensive than
anticipated, and that federal funds are too tantalizing to be foregone.
RCRA authorizes $25 million per annum for fiscal years 1978,and
1979 for hazardous waste program grants, but even assuming full
funding of the RCRA hazardous waste regulatory provisions, more
than half of this amount will be spent for state surveys of abandoned
hazardous waste disposal sites.4 6 Without substantially more funding
for program grants, states will choose either not to implement
hazardous waste programs, or else to institute programs for the
wrong reasons. State officials appear often to euphemistically claim
that state-administered programs will result in greater "flexibility"
and "responsiveness" to industry than federally administered pro-
grams. However, there is some evidence that "flexibility" may in
reality be favoritism toward state programs.
4 7
RECOMMENDATIONS
The author recommends that Congress establish regional hazard-
44. 9 BNA' ENV. REPTR. CURR. DEV. 1288 (November 10, 1978). The New England
Regional Commission is developing a regional hazardous waste management plan.
45. The author is relying on his personal experience as Special Consultant to the Division
of Water Resources, New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.
46. 9 BNA ENV. REPTR. CURR. DEV. 1302, 1343 (November 17, 24, 1978).
47. Citizens of Ohio have sued EPA to compel the withdrawal of Ohio's authority to
administer its own discharge permit program on the ground that state agencies have been
inordinately lenient with violators (8 BNA ENV. REPTR. CURR. DEV. 1587). The State of
New Jersey prohibited disposal in the state of most solid wastes generated outside the state
until the United States Supreme Court struck down the ban as "economic protectionism"
(City of Philadelphia v. State of New Jersey, 98 S.Ct. 2531 (1978)).
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ous waste management boards with exclusive authority to site
hazardous waste facilities and license hazardous waste transportation,
treatment, and disposal. Regional boards should have the power of
eminent domain to assist in their siting authority. These boards
should be funded by charges to be imposed upon generators of
hazardous waste, based upon the toxicity and persistence of wastes
generated. Rates for transportation and disposal should also be set by
the boards. Generators, transporters, and disposers of hazardous
wastes should continue to be subject to EPA regulations and state
enforcement, but boards should be granted backup enforcement
authority. State hazardous waste planning, monitoring, and enforce-
ment programs should be partially funded by grants from the
regional management boards. Generators should be made jointly and
severally liable with transporters and disposers for proper waste dis-
posal, and generators should also be required to obtain permits co-
ordinated with other discharge permit programs.
It is recognized that such direct federal control is not a panacea in
every policy area, nor is it desirable in other than exceptional cases.
But hazardous waste management is exceptional for the following
reasons: 1) the magnitude of potential danger to health and the
environment; 2) the inadequacy of private sector capacity for man-
agement under current conditions; 3) the regional nature of hazard-
ous waste management; and 4) the need for substantially greater
funding than is presently available. The system outlined above would
combine the advantages of direct federal control with those of pri-
vate sector capital and expertise in the field of hazardous waste
management.
[Vol. 19
